# Users, permissions and tokens

## Users

**Administrators** may do everything, including managing users. Everyone
else gets **grants**, `resource:access`:

| Resource | read | write |
|---|---|---|
| `config` | settings, zones, sets, services, rules, NAT, the ruleset, history, interfaces, probation (the web UI shows the forms locked) | change them, undo, import, confirm and roll back |
| `sets` | dynamic sets' entries | add and remove entries |
| `log` | hit counters and the log | – |
| `audit` | the audit log | – |
| `*` | all of the above | |

A `sets` grant can name the sets it covers: `sets:write:guests` may
change the entries of the set `guests` and no other;
`sets:read:guests,blocked` may read two. That is the grant for another
program, such as Steward's captive portal, which should be able to let a
client in and nothing more. A dynamic set's entries need a `sets` grant
even for those with `config:write`.

Only administrators may delete other tables (`hc takeover`), and manage
users and the certificate (`hc cert`, Server → Certificate).

**Roles** are ready-made sets of grants:

| Role | Grants |
|---|---|
| `viewer` | `config:read sets:read log:read` |
| `operator` | `config:write sets:write log:read audit:read` |
| `log` | `log:read`, e.g. for a monitoring script |

```sh
hc user add sam --role operator
hc user add portal --no-password --grant sets:write:guests     # tokens only
hc user update sam --grant config:read --grant log:read
```

The last administrator can't be removed, demoted or disabled.

## API tokens

A token has its user's permissions, or fewer. A token made with `--role`
or `--grant` can do only that, even if its user can do more:

```sh
hc token create portal --user portal --grant sets:write:guests --expires 365d
```

The secret is shown once; only its hash is stored. A restricted token can
only create tokens with a subset of its own grants. The web UI only offers
roles within what your account may do; a token with more would get no
more than its user anyway.

**Rotating** gives a token a new secret, keeping its ID, name and
permissions, so only the programs that use it need updating:

```sh
hc token rotate 7 --grace 1h           # the old secret works for another hour
hc token rotate --current --save       # this CLI's own token
```

A token that expires gets its lifetime again, from now (`--expires 90d`
or `never` to change it). Without `--grace` the old secret stops at once:
use that when it may have leaked. Using an old secret during its grace
period is logged, naming the token and the address, so you can find the
programs still to update. A restricted token may rotate itself and tokens
no wider than itself. `hc token list` shows when each token was last
used, and from where. `hc token revoke ID` stops one at once.

## The local socket

On the firewall, `/run/housecarl/housecarl.sock` lets root and the
`housecarl` user act as administrator without a token, and their changes
aren't on probation. The audit log shows them by their system user name.
Both can already change the machine's firewall, so this adds convenience,
not power. Anyone else on the socket needs a token, and their changes are
on probation like any other.

## The audit log

Logins (and failed ones), users, tokens, every configuration change (with
its history entry), confirmations and rollbacks, imports, takeovers and
dynamic set entries are recorded with who, from where and how: `session`,
`token` or `socket`.