diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 21457b8..9f39839 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@ All notable changes to Jarl are documented here. The format follows
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Added
+
+- **Failed logins in the journal.** A failed login (a wrong password, or
+  a wrong two-factor code) and a refused API token are logged as well as
+  audited, with the address first (`msg="login failed" ip=… user=…`,
+  `msg="token refused" ip=…`), for Guard's `jarl` preset or a fail2ban
+  filter to ban such addresses (docs/operations.md).
+
 ## [0.6.3] - 2026-10-21
 
 ### Added
diff --git a/docs/operations.md b/docs/operations.md
index 194d60f..7a69c6a 100644
--- a/docs/operations.md
+++ b/docs/operations.md
@@ -360,6 +360,23 @@ cp /etc/bind/named.conf.pre-jarl-<date> /etc/bind/named.conf
 rndc reconfig
 ```
 
+## Failed logins in the journal
+
+A failed login to the web UI or the API (a wrong password, or a wrong
+two-factor code), and a refused API token, are written to the journal as
+well as the audit log, with the address first:
+
+```
+level=WARN msg="login failed" ip=203.0.113.9 user=admin reason="wrong username or password"
+level=WARN msg="token refused" ip=203.0.113.9 reason="wrong token secret"
+```
+
+Guard's `jarl` preset, or a fail2ban filter, can ban such addresses at
+the firewall (with Housecarl's ban lists). The address comes before the
+user name, which a caller chooses, so a pattern anchored on
+`msg="login failed" ip=` can't be fooled by a name. With `log.format:
+json` they are JSON objects with the same fields in the same order.
+
 ## Monitoring
 
 * `GET /healthz` (no authentication) reports that jarld is up.
diff --git a/internal/server/authlog_test.go b/internal/server/authlog_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ed99e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/server/authlog_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"log/slog"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestFailedLoginLogged: a failed login and a refused token are logged
+// with the address first, for Guard's and fail2ban's patterns.
+func TestFailedLoginLogged(t *testing.T) {
+	e := newAPIEnv(t)
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	e.srv.log = slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(&buf, nil))
+	e.req("POST", "/auth/login", "", map[string]string{"username": "x ip=8.8.8.8", "password": "wrong"})
+	e.req("GET", "/zones", "jarl_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa_bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb", nil)
+	for _, want := range []string{`msg="login failed" ip=127.0.0.1 user="x ip=8.8.8.8"`, `msg="token refused" ip=127.0.0.1 reason=`} {
+		if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), want) {
+			t.Errorf("no %q in\n%s", want, buf.String())
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/internal/server/authn.go b/internal/server/authn.go
index d6e5736..dc4761f 100644
--- a/internal/server/authn.go
+++ b/internal/server/authn.go
@@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ func (s *Server) authenticate(r *http.Request) (*auth.Principal, *model.Session,
 		p, err := s.tokenPrincipal(r.Context(), strings.TrimSpace(tok), ip, r.UserAgent())
 		if err != nil {
 			s.limiter.fail("ip:" + ip)
+			// For Guard and fail2ban: the address first, so a name can't fake it.
+			s.log.Warn("token refused", "ip", ip, "reason", err.Error())
 			s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), &auth.Principal{IP: ip, Agent: r.UserAgent(), Method: "token"}, "auth.token_failed", "", 0, "", "failure", err.Error())
 			return nil, nil, &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "invalid API token: " + err.Error()}
 		}
@@ -328,6 +330,8 @@ func (s *Server) login(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
 		if err == nil && u.Disabled && ok {
 			reason = "account disabled"
 		}
+		// For Guard and fail2ban: the address first, so a name can't fake it.
+		s.log.Warn("login failed", "ip", ip, "user", name, "reason", reason)
 		s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), &auth.Principal{User: &model.User{Username: name}, IP: ip, Agent: r.UserAgent(), Method: "session"}, "auth.login_failed", "user", 0, name, "failure", reason)
 		return &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "login_failed", "wrong username or password"}
 	}
diff --git a/internal/server/h_acme.go b/internal/server/h_acme.go
index d2ea0e8..3375094 100644
--- a/internal/server/h_acme.go
+++ b/internal/server/h_acme.go
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ func (s *Server) httpreqPrincipal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (*auth
 	}
 	fail := func(reason string) error {
 		s.limiter.fail("ip:" + ip)
+		// For Guard and fail2ban: the address first, so a name can't fake it.
+		s.log.Warn("token refused", "ip", ip, "reason", "httpreq: "+reason)
 		s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), &auth.Principal{User: &model.User{Username: user}, IP: ip, Agent: r.UserAgent(), Method: "token"}, "auth.token_failed", "", 0, "", "failure", "httpreq: "+reason)
 		w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", httpreqRealm)
 		return &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "invalid credentials: " + reason}
diff --git a/internal/server/h_totp.go b/internal/server/h_totp.go
index 42f96e6..65ad680 100644
--- a/internal/server/h_totp.go
+++ b/internal/server/h_totp.go
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ func (s *Server) loginTOTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		s.limiter.fail("ip:"+ip, userKey)
 		left := s.pendingLogins.fail(in.Challenge)
+		// For Guard and fail2ban: the address first, so a name can't fake it.
+		s.log.Warn("login failed", "ip", ip, "user", u.Username, "reason", "wrong code: "+err.Error())
 		s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), who, "auth.totp_failed", "user", u.ID, u.Username, "failure", err.Error())
 		msg := "wrong code: use the current code from your authenticator app, or a recovery code"
 		if left == 0 {