Add a local unix socket for root on the server
jarld also listens on /run/jarl/jarl.sock (socket in jarl.yaml). Requests on it from root or jarld's own user need no token and act as an administrator; the kernel's SO_PEERCRED says who is connecting, and anyone else must send a token. The jarl CLI uses the socket when no server is configured, or with -s local, so 'sudo jarl status' works on the server with nothing set up and a lost token or password never locks root out. Changes are audited under the system user's name via "socket". The systemd unit creates /run/jarl (0750). Socket paths over 107 bytes are refused with a clear message. The docs explain the socket and what happens when a token is revoked. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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package server
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// The local unix socket (socket in jarl.yaml, /run/jarl/jarl.sock by
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// default). It serves the same API as the network listeners, but a request
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// on it without an Authorization header is trusted by who sent it: the
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// kernel reports the connecting process's user (SO_PEERCRED), and root and
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// jarld's own user get administrator rights without a token. Both can
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// already do everything (read the database, run 'jarld user token', edit
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// named.conf), so this adds convenience, not power: 'sudo jarl status'
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// works on the server with nothing configured, and a lost token or
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// password never locks out root.
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//
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// Anyone else who can reach the socket must send an API token, which then
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// gives that token's permissions, as on the network. The socket file is
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// mode 0600 in a 0750 directory, so normally only root and the jarl user
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// can connect at all; the user check doesn't rely on that.
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"io/fs"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"os/user"
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"strconv"
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"syscall"
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"jarl/internal/auth"
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"jarl/internal/model"
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)
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// peer is the process at the other end of a unix socket connection.
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type peer struct {
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UID int
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PID int
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}
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type peerKey struct{}
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// peerOf returns the socket peer of a request, or nil for network
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// requests.
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func peerOf(ctx context.Context) *peer {
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p, _ := ctx.Value(peerKey{}).(*peer)
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return p
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}
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// socketConnContext records the peer's credentials on each connection to
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// the unix socket.
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func socketConnContext(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
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uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
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if !ok {
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return ctx
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}
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p := &peer{UID: -1}
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if raw, err := uc.SyscallConn(); err == nil {
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raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
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if cred, err := syscall.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), syscall.SOL_SOCKET, syscall.SO_PEERCRED); err == nil {
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p.UID, p.PID = int(cred.Uid), int(cred.Pid)
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}
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})
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}
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// Even when the credentials can't be read, the request is marked as a
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// socket request (with no trusted user).
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return context.WithValue(ctx, peerKey{}, p)
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}
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// trustedUID reports whether a socket peer gets administrator rights
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// without a token: root and the user jarld runs as.
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func trustedUID(uid int) bool {
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return uid == 0 || uid == os.Getuid()
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}
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// socketPrincipal is the administrator for a trusted socket peer. It isn't
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// a Jarl user (ID 0), so it has no tokens or password; the audit log and
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// history show it by its system user name, e.g. "root", with method
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// "socket".
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func socketPrincipal(p *peer, agent string) *auth.Principal {
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name := "uid " + strconv.Itoa(p.UID)
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if u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(p.UID)); err == nil {
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name = u.Username
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}
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return &auth.Principal{User: &model.User{ID: 0, Username: name, Admin: true}, Method: "socket", IP: "local", Agent: agent}
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}
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// listenSocket creates the unix socket, replacing a stale one left by a
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// previous run.
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func listenSocket(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
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if len(path) > 107 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("the path is %d bytes long; unix sockets allow at most 107", len(path))
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}
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if fi, err := os.Lstat(path); err == nil {
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if fi.Mode()&fs.ModeSocket == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s exists and isn't a socket", path)
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}
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// A socket nobody answers on is left over from a previous run.
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if c, err := net.Dial("unix", path); err == nil {
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c.Close()
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s is in use by another jarld", path)
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}
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os.Remove(path)
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}
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ln, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if err := os.Chmod(path, 0o600); err != nil {
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ln.Close()
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return nil, err
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}
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return ln, nil
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}
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// socketDenied explains a refused tokenless request on the socket.
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func socketDenied(p *peer) error {
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who := "an unknown user"
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if p.UID >= 0 {
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who = "uid " + strconv.Itoa(p.UID)
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if u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(p.UID)); err == nil {
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who = u.Username
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}
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}
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return &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthenticated", "the local socket gives administrator rights without a token only to root and jarld's own user, not to " + who + "; send an API token (--token), or run the command as root"}
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}
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