Users can set up an authenticator app from their account page; login
then asks for a code after the password, with one-time recovery codes
as a fallback. Sensitive actions (tokens, user changes, 2FA resets)
need a code from the last 5 minutes. totp.require (none/admins/all)
forces setup, and admins can reset a user's 2FA from the UI, the jarl
CLI or jarld on the server. The dashboard and jarl status flag users
missing 2FA and a shared "admin" account still in use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Daily database backups: jarl-backup.timer runs 'jarld backup', which
writes jarl-<UTC time>.db into backup.dir, checks it before naming it,
and prunes by the time in the name while always keeping the newest
keep_at_least. New backup: section in jarl.yaml; the dashboard and
'jarl status' show the newest backup and warn when it is stale or
failed. The Debian package enables the timer.
- 'jarld restore [FILE | latest]': checks the backup, shows it next to
the current database, keeps the current one aside and records the
restore. 'jarld serve' holds a database lock, so a restore can't run
under a live jarld and two jarlds can't share a database.
- Token expiry warnings from 14 days ahead: dashboard, token lists, a
daily log line, and a CLI warning via the Jarl-Token-Expires header;
'jarl token list --expiring'.
- 'jarl zone serials' and the zone page's Name servers tab: compare the
serial on a primary zone's secondaries (NS records, also-notify) or a
secondary zone's primaries with this server's.
- 'jarl zone delegation': for zones on the internet, check the parent's
delegation and glue against the zone; an undelegated zone gets a note.
- Server: Jarl/<version> header; CLI exit code 2 for failed checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jarld also listens on /run/jarl/jarl.sock (socket in jarl.yaml). Requests
on it from root or jarld's own user need no token and act as an
administrator; the kernel's SO_PEERCRED says who is connecting, and
anyone else must send a token. The jarl CLI uses the socket when no server
is configured, or with -s local, so 'sudo jarl status' works on the server
with nothing set up and a lost token or password never locks root out.
Changes are audited under the system user's name via "socket".
The systemd unit creates /run/jarl (0750). Socket paths over 107 bytes
are refused with a clear message. The docs explain the socket and what
happens when a token is revoked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
jarl token rotate, a Rotate button in the web UI and
POST /api/v1/tokens/{id}/rotate give a token a new secret while it keeps
its ID, name, user and grants. The old secret stops at once or after a
grace period of up to 7 days, during which jarld logs who still uses it.
A token that expires gets its lifetime again. --save writes the new
secret where the CLI got the old one (its configuration or --token @FILE),
--write FILE to any file, and --current picks the token the CLI runs
with, so a restricted token can renew itself. A restricted token can't
rotate a wider token of its user.
Also fixes token create --save for named servers, and future times
(token expiry) shown as "just now" in the web UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jarl keeps a BIND 9.20 server's whole configuration (views, ACLs, TSIG
keys, zones of every type, records, named.conf options) in SQLite and
renders named.conf, keys.conf and zone files from it.
Every change goes through one changeset pipeline: whole-configuration
validation, named-checkconf -z and named-checkzone in a staging
directory, atomic install, rndc reconfig/reload, serial verification
with rndc zonestatus, and rollback if named does not load the change.
Changes apply one at a time by default or are bundled and applied
together. Applied changesets can be reverted.
- jarld: the daemon with the REST API and an embedded web UI, plus import,
adopt, check, resync, backup and local user recovery commands
- jarl: the CLI, including ACME DNS-01 hooks for certbot and acme.sh
- users with argon2id passwords and CSRF-protected sessions; hashed API
tokens with granular grants and roles; an audit log
- systemd unit, sysusers.d/tmpfiles.d files, Makefile
- unit tests, integration tests against a real named, scripts/e2e.sh
- docs/ guides, README and CHANGELOG
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
abrown38andClaude Opus 5.5