# Users, tokens and permissions ## Ways to authenticate | Who | How | Notes | |-----|-----|-------| | People in the web UI | Username + password → session cookie | argon2id password hashes. The session cookie is HttpOnly and SameSite=Strict and lasts 12h (2h idle). Every change also needs the session's CSRF token, which the UI sends in `X-CSRF-Token`. Changing a password logs out the user's other sessions. | | CLI, scripts, certbot | API token: `Authorization: Bearer jarl_...` | Shown once at creation, stored hashed. Optional expiry. Revocable. Last use time and IP are recorded. | | lego / Traefik (`httpreq`) | HTTP Basic: the token's user and the API token | Only on `/api/v1/acme/httpreq/...`, only when `acme.httpreq.enabled` is set, and by default only over HTTPS ([acme.md](acme.md)). The token's grants apply as usual. | | Root on the server, with the CLI | jarld's local socket (`/run/jarl/jarl.sock`): no token | `sudo jarl ...` with no server configured. The kernel tells jarld which system user is connecting; root and the `jarl` user are administrators, anyone else must send a token. Audited as the system user (e.g. `root`) via `socket`. See [The local socket](#the-local-socket). | | Root on the server | `jarld` subcommands (`init`, `user`, `import`, `adopt`, `check`, `resync`, `backup`) | Work directly on the database. They are for bootstrapping and recovery, and are audited as "local". | API tokens are how you give a script, a tool or a person limited access: a token restricted with grants (below) can, for example, only change TXT records under `_acme-challenge` in one zone. TSIG keys, on the TSIG keys page, are something else: shared secrets that BIND servers use to authenticate each other (zone transfers, NOTIFY); they don't give access to Jarl. Failed logins are rate limited: 8 per username and 20 per client IP within 15 minutes. Failed token attempts count against the IP too. Every attempt is in the audit log. A user **without a password** (`--no-password`) is a service account. It can't log in to the web UI and is used only through its tokens, which suits certbot, CI jobs and backups. ## Grants A user's permissions are a list of grants. Administrators (`admin: true`) may do everything, and only they can manage users, see everyone's tokens, run `resync`, wipe a zone's DNSSEC keys, and use the registrar (Porkbun, whose key can move the domain). A grant is written as: ``` RESOURCE:ACCESS [zones=PATTERNS] [views=PATTERNS] [names=PATTERNS] [types=TYPES] ``` | Resource | Covers | |----------|--------| | `zones` | zone definitions (create, delete, SOA, TTL, view, DNSSEC signing and the DS check) and zone options | | `records` | records in primary zones | | `views` | views and view options | | `acls` | ACLs | | `tsig` | TSIG keys (`write` is needed to see a secret) | | `options` | server options, top-level statements, the defaults for new zones, `jarl check` | | `audit` | everyone's audit events and changesets (without it, users see only their own) | | `stats` | query statistics, including client addresses and the names they look up (read only) | | `*` | all of the above | `ACCESS` is `read` or `write` (write includes read). Filters narrow a grant. Each takes comma separated patterns where `*` and `?` are wildcards, and a missing filter matches everything: * `zones=adbraun.lol,*.adbraun.lol`: zone names, without the final dot * `views=internal`: view names (`_default` means zones outside any view) * `names=_acme-challenge.*`: record owner names, as FQDNs without the final dot * `types=TXT,CNAME`: record types Examples: ``` *:read read everything records:write zones=lab.adbraun.lol edit records in one zone zones:write zones=*.lab.adbraun.lol create/delete zones below lab records:write zones=adbraun.lol views=internal only the internal copy of a split zone records:write names=_acme-challenge.* types=TXT ACME challenges anywhere records:write zones=acme.adbraun.lol types=TXT only TXT records in a dedicated ACME zone ``` A user who may see some records of a zone may also see that the zone exists (its name and type), but not its other records. ### Roles Roles are ready-made grant lists. Choosing a role copies its grants, which you can then edit. | Role | Grants | |------|--------| | `readonly` | `*:read` (includes statistics) | | `dns-editor` | `zones:write`, `records:write`, `views:read`, `acls:read`, `options:read` | | `operator` | `*:write` (everything except user management) | | `acme` | `records:write names=_acme-challenge.* types=TXT` | ```sh jarl user create alice --role dns-editor jarl user update alice --grant "records:write zones=adbraun.lol" --grant "zones:read" # replaces all grants jarl user update alice --role readonly ``` ## Tokens Every token belongs to a user, and every token request acts as that user. The audit log shows the user and the token name. * A token **without grants** has all of its user's permissions, and they follow the user: if the user loses a permission, so does the token. * A token **with grants** is restricted to them. Effective permission is *user grants ∩ token grants*: a token can never do more than its user. Admin rights don't pass through a restricted token. * A restricted token can create further tokens, but only ones no wider than itself. * Disabling or deleting a user stops all their tokens at once. ```sh jarl token create laptop # full rights of the user, no expiry jarl token create ci --grant "records:write zones=lab.adbraun.lol" --expires 90d jarl token create certbot --user certbot --role acme # admin: a token for another user jarl token list --all jarl token revoke 12 ``` In the web UI: Account → API tokens (your own) and Users → *user* → Tokens (admin). ### Expiring tokens A token with an expiry stops working at that moment. So that it doesn't catch you out (a certbot token that expired breaks renewals silently, until the certificate itself expires), Jarl warns from **14 days before**: * the dashboard lists the tokens that expire soon or expired in the last 14 days (administrators see everyone's, others their own), and token lists mark them *soon* or *expired*; * jarld logs a warning once a day for each of them; * every response to such a token carries a `Jarl-Token-Expires` header, and the `jarl` CLI prints a warning on stderr when it sees it, so the logs of the script using the token show it; * `jarl token list --all --expiring` lists them (`--expiring 60d` looks further ahead). Rotating the token (below) gives it a new lifetime, and keeps its permissions. ### Rotating a token Rotating gives a token a **new secret** and changes nothing else: it keeps its ID, name, user, grants and audit history, so there is nothing to set up again. Only the programs that use the token need the new secret. Use it on a schedule, when someone who knew the token leaves, or when it may have leaked. Revoking is for a token that is no longer needed. ```sh jarl token rotate 12 # by ID (see 'jarl token list') jarl token rotate laptop --save # by name, and update the CLI's configuration jarl token rotate deploy --user ci --grace 1h # another user's token (admin), old secret works 1 more hour jarl token rotate --current --save # the token this CLI runs with ``` * **The old secret** stops working at once. With `--grace` (at most 7d) it keeps working for that long, so clients can be switched over without an outage. While it does, jarld logs a warning each time the old secret is used (at most once a minute per token and address), with the client's IP, so you can find what still needs updating: `journalctl -u jarl | grep "old secret"`. `jarl token list` and the web UI show when the old secret stops. Rotating again ends the previous grace period. If the token may have leaked, rotate without `--grace`. * **Expiry**: a token that expires gets its lifetime again, counted from now, so a 90-day token is good for another 90 days. `--expires 30d` sets a new lifetime and `--no-expiry` removes the expiry. A token without an expiry keeps having none. * **Where the new secret goes**: it is printed once, like a new token. `--write FILE` writes it to a file instead (an existing file keeps its owner and mode; a new one gets mode 0600). `--save` puts it where the CLI got its token from: the configuration file (the selected server's entry) or the file named in `--token @FILE`. `--save` refuses before rotating when the token came from a literal `--token` or `JARL_TOKEN`. * **Who may rotate**: administrators any token; users their own tokens. A restricted token may rotate itself and tokens no wider than itself, but not a wider token of its user, since it would learn that token's secret. So automation can renew its own token, for example a monthly timer: ```sh jarl --token @/etc/jarl/certbot.token token rotate --current --save ``` * Every rotation is in the audit log (`token.rotate`), with when the old secret stops and the new expiry. In the web UI, the **Rotate** button next to each token asks how long the old secret should keep working and how long the token should last, then shows the new secret once. ## The local socket jarld also listens on a unix socket, `/run/jarl/jarl.sock` (`socket` in jarl.yaml; systemd creates `/run/jarl`). It serves the same API, but a request on it without a token is trusted by **who sent it**: the kernel reports the connecting process's user (`SO_PEERCRED`), and | Connecting user | Without a token | With a token | |--|--|--| | root | administrator | the token's permissions | | `jarl` (jarld's own user) | administrator | the token's permissions | | anyone else | refused (401) | the token's permissions | This gives root nothing it doesn't already have: root can read Jarl's database, run `jarld user token` and edit named.conf directly. What it adds is convenience and a way back in: on the server, `sudo jarl status` and every other command work with nothing configured and no token stored in a file, even after every token has been revoked and every password forgotten. * The socket file is mode 0600 in a 0750 directory owned by `jarl`, so other users can't even connect; the user check doesn't depend on that. * Changes made this way are in the history and audit log under the system user's name (`root`) with `socket` as the method. That name isn't a Jarl user, so it has no tokens of its own: `sudo jarl token create laptop --user admin` makes one for a real user. * The CLI uses the socket only when no server is configured at all, or with `-s local`, so a configured server is never silently swapped for the local one ([cli.md](cli.md#on-the-server-itself)). * Turn it off with `socket: ""` in jarl.yaml. ## Recovering access Revoking a token never locks you out: tokens and web sessions are separate. Revoking the token your CLI uses stops only the programs that use it; you stay logged in to the web UI with your password, with all your rights, and can make a new token under Account → API tokens. Jarl also refuses to delete, disable or demote the last administrator. On the server, root can always use the CLI through the local socket, without a token: ```sh sudo jarl whoami sudo jarl token create laptop --user admin # a new token for admin sudo jarl user update admin --password # a new password ``` The `jarld` subcommands work even when jarld isn't running. As root or the `jarl` user: ```sh sudo -u jarl jarld user list sudo -u jarl jarld user passwd admin # set a new password and re-enable the account sudo -u jarl jarld user add --admin rescue # a new administrator sudo -u jarl jarld user token admin cli # a new API token for a user ```