Files
adamandClaude Opus 5.5 c27a6c10bd Mail reverse DNS check, what Jarl adds to named.conf, lists one per line
jarld checks the reverse DNS of the public zones' MX and SPF addresses as the internet sees it, every 6 hours (Exposure page, jarl exposure mail, jarl_mail_reverse_dns_ok). The Server options page, jarl option generated and GET /options/generated list what Jarl writes into named.conf by itself; stats.rate_limit_log turns off the query-errors logging. Option lists of three or more elements are shown one per line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 21:02:11 +01:00

600 lines
17 KiB
Go

// Package server implements Jarl's HTTP API and serves the web UI.
package server
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
"time"
"jarl/internal/api"
"jarl/internal/auth"
"jarl/internal/certs"
"jarl/internal/encdns"
"jarl/internal/engine"
"jarl/internal/mailcheck"
"jarl/internal/nscheck"
"jarl/internal/porkbun"
"jarl/internal/stats"
"jarl/internal/store"
)
// Config configures the HTTP server.
type Config struct {
Listen []string
TLSCertFile string
TLSKeyFile string
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
SessionLifetime time.Duration
SessionIdle time.Duration
// CookieSecure is "auto" (secure when TLS is used or the request came
// through a trusted HTTPS proxy), "always" or "never".
CookieSecure string
MaxBodyBytes int64
Version string
// Stats is the query statistics collector (nil when disabled).
Stats *stats.Collector
// HTTPReq configures the endpoint for lego's httpreq DNS provider.
HTTPReq HTTPReq
// Socket is the local unix socket's path ("" for none); see socket.go.
Socket string
// BackupDir and BackupWarnAfter are the backup settings the dashboard
// reports on (backup.dir and backup.warn_after).
BackupDir string
BackupWarnAfter time.Duration
// Porkbun manages domains' delegation at the registrar Porkbun (nil
// without an API key); PorkbunAllows says which domains it may touch.
Porkbun *porkbun.Client
PorkbunAllows func(domain string) bool
// TOTPRequire is totp.require (none, admins or all) and TOTPIssuer the
// name authenticator apps show (h_totp.go).
TOTPRequire string
TOTPIssuer string
// Metrics configures /metrics (metrics.go).
Metrics Metrics
// RateLimitLog says rate limiting's log lines reach the statistics
// (stats.rate_limit_log), for the Exposure page.
RateLimitLog bool
// Resolvers are public recursive resolvers (acme.resolvers), to see
// the mail addresses' reverse DNS as receivers do.
Resolvers []string
// Certs manages TLS certificates (nil in tests that don't need it),
// including the one jarld serves (h_certs.go, sniff.go).
Certs *certs.Manager
}
// Server is the HTTP server.
type Server struct {
cfg Config
eng *engine.Engine
store *store.Store
log *slog.Logger
mux *http.ServeMux
limiter *rateLimiter
web fs.FS
certs *certReloader
statsQ *stats.Querier
// oldSecretWarn limits warnings about rotated tokens' old secrets.
oldSecretWarn throttle
// expiryWarn limits warnings about expiring tokens to one a day each.
expiryWarn throttle
// pendingLogins are logins waiting for their TOTP code.
pendingLogins pendingLogins
// nsChecker, when set, replaces the default name server checker
// (tests point it at local DNS servers).
nsChecker *nscheck.Checker
// started is when the server was created; metricsCache holds the Jarl
// state part of /metrics.
started time.Time
metricsCache metricsCache
// encHealth is the last check of encrypted DNS's listeners
// (h_encdns.go); encRoots the CAs it trusts (nil: the system's).
encHealth struct {
sync.Mutex
h *encdns.Health
}
encRoots *x509.CertPool
// mail is the last check of the mail addresses' reverse DNS (h_mail.go).
mail struct {
sync.Mutex
r *mailcheck.Report
}
mu sync.Mutex
srvs []*http.Server
}
// New creates a server. web holds the static web UI (may be nil).
func New(cfg Config, eng *engine.Engine, log *slog.Logger, web fs.FS) *Server {
if cfg.SessionLifetime == 0 {
cfg.SessionLifetime = 12 * time.Hour
}
if cfg.SessionIdle == 0 {
cfg.SessionIdle = 2 * time.Hour
}
if cfg.MaxBodyBytes == 0 {
cfg.MaxBodyBytes = 16 << 20
}
if cfg.CookieSecure == "" {
cfg.CookieSecure = "auto"
}
if cfg.TOTPRequire == "" {
cfg.TOTPRequire = "none"
}
if cfg.TOTPIssuer == "" {
cfg.TOTPIssuer = "Jarl"
}
if log == nil {
log = slog.Default()
}
s := &Server{cfg: cfg, eng: eng, store: eng.Store(), log: log, mux: http.NewServeMux(), limiter: newRateLimiter(), web: web, started: time.Now()}
s.expiryWarn.every = 24 * time.Hour
if cfg.Stats != nil {
s.statsQ = stats.NewQuerier(cfg.Stats)
}
s.routes()
return s
}
// Handler returns the server's HTTP handler with all middleware.
// lowPort reports whether addr ("host:port") has a port below 1024.
func lowPort(addr string) bool {
_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return false
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
return err == nil && n > 0 && n < 1024
}
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
return s.recoverer(s.securityHeaders(s.logRequests(s.mux)))
}
// Serve listens on all configured addresses until ctx is canceled.
func (s *Server) Serve(ctx context.Context, ready func()) error {
if len(s.cfg.Listen) == 0 {
return errors.New("no listen addresses configured")
}
if s.cfg.TLSCertFile != "" {
cr, err := newCertReloader(s.cfg.TLSCertFile, s.cfg.TLSKeyFile, s.log)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.certs = cr
}
// With a certificate (tls.cert_file, or one Jarl manages, which may
// turn up later), the listeners serve HTTPS and plain HTTP side by
// side (sniff.go).
var tlsCfg *tls.Config
if s.certs != nil || s.cfg.Certs != nil {
tlsCfg = &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12, GetCertificate: s.webCertificate, NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}}
}
errc := make(chan error, len(s.cfg.Listen)+1)
var listeners []net.Listener
for _, addr := range s.cfg.Listen {
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
for _, l := range listeners {
l.Close()
}
if errors.Is(err, syscall.EACCES) && lowPort(addr) {
return fmt.Errorf("listening on %s: %w (ports below 1024 need the CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE capability; Jarl's jarl.service grants it, so check that the installed unit is current and no drop-in removes it: systemctl cat jarl)", addr, err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("listening on %s: %w", addr, err)
}
listeners = append(listeners, ln)
}
for i, ln := range listeners {
handler := s.Handler()
if tlsCfg != nil {
handler = s.requireHTTPS(handler)
}
srv := &http.Server{
Handler: handler,
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
ReadTimeout: 2 * time.Minute,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,
IdleTimeout: 2 * time.Minute,
TLSConfig: tlsCfg,
ErrorLog: slog.NewLogLogger(s.log.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.srvs = append(s.srvs, srv)
s.mu.Unlock()
scheme := "http"
if s.httpsAvailable() {
scheme = "https"
}
s.log.Info("listening", "addr", s.cfg.Listen[i], "url", scheme+"://"+ln.Addr().String())
if tlsCfg != nil {
ln = newSniffListener(ln, tlsCfg)
}
go func(srv *http.Server, ln net.Listener) {
if err := srv.Serve(ln); !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
errc <- err
}
}(srv, ln)
}
if !s.httpsAvailable() && (s.cfg.Certs == nil || !s.cfg.Certs.HasWeb(ctx)) {
for _, a := range s.cfg.Listen {
if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(a); err == nil {
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); host == "" || err == nil && !ip.IsLoopback() {
s.log.Warn("serving plain HTTP on a non-loopback address: passwords and API tokens travel unencrypted; configure tls or a TLS reverse proxy", "addr", a)
}
}
}
}
if err := s.serveMetricsListeners(errc); err != nil {
s.shutdown()
return err
}
s.serveSocket(errc)
s.logHTTPReq(s.httpsAvailable())
if ready != nil {
ready()
}
go s.housekeeping(ctx)
go s.mailLoop(ctx)
go func() {
// Once jarld and named have settled after a start.
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
s.checkEncryptedDNS(ctx)
}
}()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case err := <-errc:
s.shutdown()
return err
}
s.shutdown()
return nil
}
// serveSocket serves the API on the local unix socket. A socket that
// can't be created (e.g. /run/jarl missing outside systemd) is logged, not
// fatal: the network listeners still work.
func (s *Server) serveSocket(errc chan error) {
if s.cfg.Socket == "" {
return
}
ln, err := listenSocket(s.cfg.Socket)
if err != nil {
s.log.Warn("not listening on the local socket", "path", s.cfg.Socket, "err", err)
return
}
srv := &http.Server{
Handler: s.Handler(),
ConnContext: socketConnContext,
ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
WriteTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,
IdleTimeout: 2 * time.Minute,
ErrorLog: slog.NewLogLogger(s.log.Handler(), slog.LevelWarn),
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.srvs = append(s.srvs, srv)
s.mu.Unlock()
s.log.Info("listening", "socket", s.cfg.Socket)
go func() {
if err := srv.Serve(ln); !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
errc <- err
}
}()
}
func (s *Server) shutdown() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
for _, srv := range s.srvs {
srv.Shutdown(ctx)
}
if s.cfg.Socket != "" {
os.Remove(s.cfg.Socket)
}
}
// ReloadTLS rereads the TLS certificate (on SIGHUP).
func (s *Server) ReloadTLS() {
if s.certs != nil {
s.certs.reload()
}
}
func (s *Server) housekeeping(ctx context.Context) {
t := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Minute)
defer t.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-t.C:
if err := s.store.PurgeSessions(ctx, time.Now()); err != nil {
s.log.Warn("purging sessions failed", "err", err)
}
s.limiter.cleanup()
s.warnExpiringTokens(ctx, time.Now())
s.checkEncryptedDNS(ctx)
if s.certs != nil {
s.certs.reloadIfChanged()
}
}
}
}
// certReloader serves a certificate that is reread when the files change,
// so renewed certificates (e.g. from Let's Encrypt) are picked up.
type certReloader struct {
certFile, keyFile string
log *slog.Logger
mu sync.RWMutex
cert *tls.Certificate
modTime time.Time
}
func newCertReloader(certFile, keyFile string, log *slog.Logger) (*certReloader, error) {
cr := &certReloader{certFile: certFile, keyFile: keyFile, log: log}
if err := cr.load(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cr, nil
}
func (cr *certReloader) load() error {
cert, err := tls.LoadX509KeyPair(cr.certFile, cr.keyFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("loading TLS certificate: %w", err)
}
fi, _ := os.Stat(cr.certFile)
cr.mu.Lock()
cr.cert = &cert
if fi != nil {
cr.modTime = fi.ModTime()
}
cr.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
func (cr *certReloader) reload() {
if err := cr.load(); err != nil {
cr.log.Error("reloading TLS certificate failed", "err", err)
return
}
cr.log.Info("TLS certificate reloaded", "file", cr.certFile)
}
func (cr *certReloader) reloadIfChanged() {
fi, err := os.Stat(cr.certFile)
if err != nil {
return
}
cr.mu.RLock()
changed := fi.ModTime().After(cr.modTime)
cr.mu.RUnlock()
if changed {
cr.reload()
}
}
func (cr *certReloader) get(*tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
cr.mu.RLock()
defer cr.mu.RUnlock()
return cr.cert, nil
}
// ---- middleware
type ctxKey int
const (
keyPrincipal ctxKey = iota
keySession
)
func (s *Server) recoverer(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() {
if v := recover(); v != nil {
if v == http.ErrAbortHandler {
panic(v)
}
s.log.Error("panic serving request", "path", r.URL.Path, "panic", v)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal", "internal server error")
}
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func (s *Server) securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h := w.Header()
// The version is no secret: /healthz reports it too.
h.Set("Server", "Jarl/"+s.cfg.Version)
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'")
h.Set("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", "same-origin")
if s.isHTTPS(r) {
h.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000")
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
type statusWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
status int
bytes int
}
func (w *statusWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
w.status = code
w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
// Unwrap lets http.ResponseController reach the connection (to flush a
// streamed response).
func (w *statusWriter) Unwrap() http.ResponseWriter { return w.ResponseWriter }
func (w *statusWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
n, err := w.ResponseWriter.Write(b)
w.bytes += n
return n, err
}
func (s *Server) logRequests(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
sw := &statusWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
if r.URL.Path == "/healthz" || strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/assets/") {
return
}
user := ""
if p, ok := r.Context().Value(keyPrincipal).(*auth.Principal); ok {
user = p.Name()
}
s.log.Debug("http", "method", r.Method, "path", r.URL.Path, "status", sw.status, "bytes", sw.bytes, "duration", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond), "ip", s.clientIP(r), "user", user)
})
}
// clientIP returns the client's address, honoring X-Forwarded-For from
// trusted proxies.
func (s *Server) clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
if peerOf(r.Context()) != nil {
return "local"
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil || !s.trusted(peer) {
return host
}
xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For")
if xff == "" {
return host
}
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
// Walk from the right, skipping trusted proxies.
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
a, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(parts[i]))
if err != nil {
return host
}
if !s.trusted(a) {
return a.String()
}
}
return strings.TrimSpace(parts[0])
}
func (s *Server) trusted(a netip.Addr) bool {
a = a.Unmap()
for _, p := range s.cfg.TrustedProxies {
if p.Contains(a) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// logHTTPReq says at startup whether the httpreq endpoint can work.
func (s *Server) logHTTPReq(tls bool) {
h := s.cfg.HTTPReq
switch {
case !h.Enabled:
case h.AllowPlainHTTP:
s.log.Warn("acme.httpreq accepts plain HTTP (require_https: false): API tokens may travel unencrypted", "path", api.Prefix+"/acme/httpreq")
case !tls && len(s.cfg.TrustedProxies) == 0 && !h.AllowLoopbackHTTP:
s.log.Warn("acme.httpreq is enabled but jarld has no tls and no trusted_proxies, so every request will be refused as not HTTPS", "path", api.Prefix+"/acme/httpreq")
default:
s.log.Info("acme.httpreq endpoint enabled", "path", api.Prefix+"/acme/httpreq", "tls", tls, "trusted_proxies", len(s.cfg.TrustedProxies), "allow_loopback_http", h.AllowLoopbackHTTP)
}
}
func (s *Server) isHTTPS(r *http.Request) bool {
https, _ := s.transport(r)
return https
}
// transport reports whether r reached Jarl over HTTPS, and explains how
// that was decided (for error messages and the httpreq status check).
//
// A request is HTTPS when jarld terminated TLS itself (tls in jarl.yaml),
// or when it came straight from a trusted proxy (trusted_proxies) that
// says the client used HTTPS: X-Forwarded-Proto, or, if that is absent,
// the proto parameter of Forwarded (RFC 7239). Proxies append to these
// headers, so the last value is the one the nearest proxy set; anything a
// client sent itself comes earlier and is ignored. From any other address
// the headers are ignored, since anyone could send them.
func (s *Server) transport(r *http.Request) (https bool, why string) {
if r.TLS != nil {
return true, "HTTPS to jarld (tls in jarl.yaml)"
}
if peerOf(r.Context()) != nil {
return true, "jarld's local unix socket (never crosses a network)"
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil || !s.trusted(peer) {
if r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto") != "" || r.Header.Get("Forwarded") != "" {
return false, fmt.Sprintf("plain HTTP from %s, which sent X-Forwarded-Proto or Forwarded but isn't in trusted_proxies, so the header was ignored", host)
}
return false, fmt.Sprintf("plain HTTP from %s (jarld has no tls configured, and %s isn't a trusted proxy)", host, host)
}
proto, header := forwardedProto(r)
switch {
case proto == "":
return false, fmt.Sprintf("trusted proxy %s, which sent neither X-Forwarded-Proto nor Forwarded: proto=, so the client's protocol is unknown", host)
case proto == "https":
return true, fmt.Sprintf("HTTPS to trusted proxy %s (%s: https)", host, header)
default:
return false, fmt.Sprintf("trusted proxy %s, which says the client used %s (%s: %s)", host, proto, header, proto)
}
}
// forwardedProto returns the client's protocol as the nearest proxy
// reported it, and the header it came from.
func forwardedProto(r *http.Request) (proto, header string) {
if vals := r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-Proto"); len(vals) > 0 {
parts := strings.Split(strings.Join(vals, ","), ",")
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(parts[len(parts)-1])), "X-Forwarded-Proto"
}
if vals := r.Header.Values("Forwarded"); len(vals) > 0 {
elems := strings.Split(strings.Join(vals, ","), ",")
for _, pair := range strings.Split(elems[len(elems)-1], ";") {
k, v, _ := strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(pair), "=")
if strings.EqualFold(k, "proto") {
return strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(v), `"`)), "Forwarded"
}
}
}
return "", ""
}