Files
jarl/internal/nscheck/nscheck_test.go
T
abrown38andClaude Opus 5.5 5630e7a848 Add DNSSEC signing, key backups and Porkbun support
Zones get a DNSSEC setting: named signs them with BIND's default (or a
custom) dnssec-policy and inline signing, with keys in a per-view key
directory. Jarl shows the keys, the DS record and when it is safe to
publish it, checks the parent's DS records (check-ds, which also tells
named), and refuses steps that would break a signed domain: switching
straight to unsigned, finishing a turn-off too early, deleting or moving
a signed zone, TTLs above max-zone-ttl. Turning off goes through the
insecure policy; wipe starts over once the parent has no DS.

Backups store the DNSSEC keys and restore puts them back for named; the
backup unit gets CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to read them. Jarl raises a zone's
serial above named's whenever it writes an older one (after a restore).
The serials check compares the signed serial.

With a Porkbun API key in jarl.yaml, the registrar's name servers, glue
records and DS records can be shown and changed, each change checked
first (dry run, force to override).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 21:19:04 +00:00

310 lines
11 KiB
Go

package nscheck
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"jarl/internal/dnssec"
)
// fake is a DNS server on one loopback address that answers with fn.
type fake func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg
// serve starts fake servers on 127.0.0.x addresses, all on the same port,
// and returns the port.
func serve(t *testing.T, servers map[string]fake) string {
t.Helper()
port := ""
for addr, fn := range servers {
hp := net.JoinHostPort(addr, "0")
if port != "" {
hp = net.JoinHostPort(addr, port)
}
pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", hp)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("can't listen on %s: %v", hp, err)
}
if port == "" {
_, port, _ = net.SplitHostPort(pc.LocalAddr().String())
}
fn := fn
srv := &dns.Server{PacketConn: pc, Handler: dns.HandlerFunc(func(w dns.ResponseWriter, req *dns.Msg) {
resp := fn(req.Question[0])
if resp == nil {
return // no answer: a timeout
}
rcode, aa := resp.Rcode, resp.Authoritative
resp.SetReply(req) // resets both
resp.Rcode, resp.Authoritative = rcode, aa
w.WriteMsg(resp)
})}
go srv.ActivateAndServe()
t.Cleanup(func() { srv.Shutdown() })
}
return port
}
func rr(s string) dns.RR {
r, err := dns.NewRR(s)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return r
}
// authSOA answers SOA queries for zone authoritatively with serial.
func authSOA(zone string, serial uint32) fake {
return func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
m.Authoritative = true
if q.Qtype == dns.TypeSOA && strings.EqualFold(q.Name, zone) {
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr(zone + " 3600 IN SOA ns1." + zone + " admin." + zone + " " + itoa(serial) + " 3600 900 1209600 300")}
}
return m
}
}
func itoa(n uint32) string { return strconv.FormatUint(uint64(n), 10) }
func checker(port, resolver string) *Checker {
return &Checker{
Timeout: 300 * time.Millisecond,
Port: port,
Resolver: resolver,
IsLocal: func(a netip.Addr) bool { return a.String() == "127.0.0.9" },
}
}
func TestSerials(t *testing.T) {
zone := "example.com."
port := serve(t, map[string]fake{
"127.0.0.2": authSOA(zone, 2026100805),
"127.0.0.3": authSOA(zone, 2026100803),
"127.0.0.4": func(dns.Question) *dns.Msg { return new(dns.Msg) }, // answers, not authoritative
"127.0.0.5": func(dns.Question) *dns.Msg { m := new(dns.Msg); m.Rcode = dns.RcodeRefused; return m },
"127.0.0.6": func(dns.Question) *dns.Msg { return nil }, // never answers
})
ref := uint32(2026100805)
res := checker(port, "").Serials(context.Background(), zone, &ref, []Target{
{Name: "ns1.example.com.", Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.9"}, Source: "NS record"},
{Name: "ns2.example.com.", Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.2"}, Source: "NS record"},
{Name: "ns3.example.com.", Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.3"}, Source: "NS record"},
{Name: "ns4.example.com.", Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.4"}, Source: "NS record"},
{Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.5"}, Source: "also-notify"},
{Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.6", "127.0.0.2"}, Source: "also-notify"}, // 127.0.0.2 again: asked once
})
got := map[string]Result{}
for _, r := range res {
got[r.Address] = r
}
if len(res) != 6 {
t.Errorf("%d results: %+v", len(res), res)
}
check := func(addr, status string) {
t.Helper()
if got[addr].Status != status {
t.Errorf("%s: %+v, want %s", addr, got[addr], status)
}
}
check("127.0.0.9", "self")
check("127.0.0.2", "in_sync")
check("127.0.0.3", "behind")
check("127.0.0.4", "not_authoritative")
check("127.0.0.5", "refused")
check("127.0.0.6", "unreachable")
if got["127.0.0.3"].Diff != -2 || *got["127.0.0.3"].Serial != 2026100803 {
t.Errorf("behind: %+v", got["127.0.0.3"])
}
// Without a serial to compare with, an answer is just an answer.
res = checker(port, "").Serials(context.Background(), zone, nil, []Target{{Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.2"}}})
if res[0].Status != "answered" || !res[0].OK() {
t.Errorf("no reference: %+v", res[0])
}
}
func TestSerialWraparound(t *testing.T) {
// RFC 1982: 1 is ahead of 4294967295.
zone := "example.com."
port := serve(t, map[string]fake{"127.0.0.2": authSOA(zone, 1)})
ref := uint32(4294967295)
res := checker(port, "").Serials(context.Background(), zone, &ref, []Target{{Addresses: []string{"127.0.0.2"}}})
if res[0].Status != "ahead" || res[0].Diff != 2 {
t.Errorf("%+v", res[0])
}
}
// internet builds a small fake DNS tree: a resolver, a parent server for
// "lol." and the child's servers.
func internet(t *testing.T, parent fake) (port, resolver string) {
port = serve(t, map[string]fake{
// The recursive resolver.
"127.0.0.10": func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
m.RecursionAvailable = true
switch {
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeSOA && q.Name == "lol.":
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr("lol. 300 IN SOA ns.nic.lol. hostmaster.lol. 1 3600 900 1209600 300")}
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeNS && q.Name == "lol.":
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr("lol. 300 IN NS ns.nic.lol.")}
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeA && q.Name == "ns.nic.lol.":
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr("ns.nic.lol. 300 IN A 127.0.0.11")}
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeA && q.Name == "ns.elsewhere.net.":
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr("ns.elsewhere.net. 300 IN A 127.0.0.13")}
}
return m
},
"127.0.0.11": parent,
// ns1.adbraun.lol: serves the zone.
"127.0.0.12": authSOA("adbraun.lol.", 7),
// ns.elsewhere.net: doesn't serve it (lame).
"127.0.0.13": func(dns.Question) *dns.Msg { m := new(dns.Msg); m.Rcode = dns.RcodeRefused; return m },
})
return port, net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.10", port)
}
func levels(rep *DelegationReport) map[string][]string {
out := map[string][]string{}
for _, f := range rep.Findings {
out[f.Level] = append(out[f.Level], f.Message)
}
return out
}
func TestDelegationMismatch(t *testing.T) {
port, res := internet(t, func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
if q.Qtype == dns.TypeNS && q.Name == "adbraun.lol." {
m.Ns = []dns.RR{rr("adbraun.lol. 3600 IN NS ns1.adbraun.lol."), rr("adbraun.lol. 3600 IN NS ns.elsewhere.net.")}
m.Extra = []dns.RR{rr("ns1.adbraun.lol. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.12")}
}
return m
})
ref := uint32(7)
rep := checker(port, res).Delegation(context.Background(), "adbraun.lol.",
[]string{"ns1.adbraun.lol.", "ns2.adbraun.lol."},
map[string][]string{"ns1.adbraun.lol.": {"127.0.0.99"}, "ns2.adbraun.lol.": {"127.0.0.14"}}, &ref, nil)
if rep.Parent != "lol." || !rep.Delegated {
t.Fatalf("report: %+v", rep)
}
l := levels(rep)
all := strings.Join(append(append(l["error"], l["warning"]...), l["info"]...), "\n")
for _, want := range []string{
"delegates to ns.elsewhere.net, which the zone's NS records don't list",
"list ns2.adbraun.lol, which the parent doesn't delegate to",
"glue for ns1.adbraun.lol is 127.0.0.12, but the zone says 127.0.0.99",
"ns.elsewhere.net (127.0.0.13): refuses queries",
} {
if !strings.Contains(all, want) {
t.Errorf("missing finding %q in:\n%s", want, all)
}
}
if len(rep.Glue) != 1 || rep.Glue[0].Match {
t.Errorf("glue: %+v", rep.Glue)
}
}
func TestDelegationGood(t *testing.T) {
port, res := internet(t, func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
if q.Qtype == dns.TypeNS && q.Name == "adbraun.lol." {
m.Ns = []dns.RR{rr("adbraun.lol. 3600 IN NS ns1.adbraun.lol.")}
m.Extra = []dns.RR{rr("ns1.adbraun.lol. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.12")}
}
return m
})
ref := uint32(7)
rep := checker(port, res).Delegation(context.Background(), "adbraun.lol.", []string{"ns1.adbraun.lol."}, map[string][]string{"ns1.adbraun.lol.": {"127.0.0.12"}}, &ref, nil)
l := levels(rep)
if len(l["error"])+len(l["warning"])+len(l["info"]) != 0 || len(l["ok"]) != 2 {
t.Errorf("findings: %v", l)
}
}
func TestNotDelegated(t *testing.T) {
// An internal-only zone: one calm note, no warnings.
port, res := internet(t, func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
m.Authoritative = true
m.Rcode = dns.RcodeNameError
m.Ns = []dns.RR{rr("lol. 300 IN SOA ns.nic.lol. hostmaster.lol. 1 3600 900 1209600 300")}
return m
})
rep := checker(port, res).Delegation(context.Background(), "adbraun.lol.", []string{"ns1.adbraun.lol."}, nil, nil, nil)
l := levels(rep)
if rep.Delegated || len(l["info"]) != 1 || len(l["warning"])+len(l["error"]) != 0 {
t.Errorf("findings: %v", l)
}
if !strings.Contains(l["info"][0], "adbraun.lol isn't delegated from the parent zone lol, so the internet can't see it. That's expected for a zone used only on your own network") {
t.Errorf("note: %s", l["info"][0])
}
}
func TestDelegationDS(t *testing.T) {
const dsData = "22642 13 2 0B7A2F5E1C8E2F6A0B7A2F5E1C8E2F6A0B7A2F5E1C8E2F6A0B7A2F5E1C8E2F6A"
parent := func(withDS bool) fake {
return func(q dns.Question) *dns.Msg {
m := new(dns.Msg)
switch {
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeNS && q.Name == "adbraun.lol.":
m.Ns = []dns.RR{rr("adbraun.lol. 3600 IN NS ns1.adbraun.lol.")}
m.Extra = []dns.RR{rr("ns1.adbraun.lol. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.12")}
case q.Qtype == dns.TypeDS && q.Name == "adbraun.lol.":
m.Authoritative = true
if withDS {
m.Answer = []dns.RR{rr("adbraun.lol. 3600 IN DS " + dsData)}
}
}
return m
}
}
ours := dnssec.DS{KeyTag: 22642, Algorithm: 13, DigestType: 2, Digest: strings.Fields(dsData)[3]}
other := ours
other.KeyTag, other.Digest = 1111, strings.Repeat("AB", 32)
ref := uint32(7)
for _, c := range []struct {
name string
withDS bool
sig Signing
level string
want string
}{
{"secure", true, Signing{Policy: "default", DS: []dnssec.DS{ours}}, "ok", "matches the zone's key 22642"},
{"wrong key", true, Signing{Policy: "default", DS: []dnssec.DS{other}}, "error", "matches none of the zone's keys"},
{"unsigned", true, Signing{}, "error", "but the zone isn't signed"},
{"turning off", true, Signing{Policy: "insecure", DS: []dnssec.DS{ours}}, "warning", "remove it at your registrar"},
{"no DS yet", false, Signing{Policy: "default", DS: []dnssec.DS{ours}}, "info", "the parent has no DS record for it"},
{"DS gone", false, Signing{Policy: "insecure"}, "ok", "turning DNSSEC off can go ahead"},
} {
port, res := internet(t, parent(c.withDS))
sig := c.sig
rep := checker(port, res).Delegation(context.Background(), "adbraun.lol.", []string{"ns1.adbraun.lol."}, map[string][]string{"ns1.adbraun.lol.": {"127.0.0.12"}}, &ref, &sig)
found := false
for _, f := range rep.Findings {
if f.Level == c.level && strings.Contains(f.Message, c.want) {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("%s: no %s finding %q in %+v", c.name, c.level, c.want, rep.Findings)
}
if c.withDS && (len(rep.ParentDS) != 1 || rep.ParentDS[0].KeyTag != 22642) {
t.Errorf("%s: parent DS %+v", c.name, rep.ParentDS)
}
}
// Unsigned and no DS: nothing about DNSSEC.
port, res := internet(t, parent(false))
rep := checker(port, res).Delegation(context.Background(), "adbraun.lol.", []string{"ns1.adbraun.lol."}, map[string][]string{"ns1.adbraun.lol.": {"127.0.0.12"}}, &ref, &Signing{})
for _, f := range rep.Findings {
if strings.Contains(f.Message, "DS") {
t.Errorf("unsigned zone: %+v", f)
}
}
}