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jarl/docs/validation.md
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abrown38andClaude Opus 5.5 5630e7a848 Add DNSSEC signing, key backups and Porkbun support
Zones get a DNSSEC setting: named signs them with BIND's default (or a
custom) dnssec-policy and inline signing, with keys in a per-view key
directory. Jarl shows the keys, the DS record and when it is safe to
publish it, checks the parent's DS records (check-ds, which also tells
named), and refuses steps that would break a signed domain: switching
straight to unsigned, finishing a turn-off too early, deleting or moving
a signed zone, TTLs above max-zone-ttl. Turning off goes through the
insecure policy; wipe starts over once the parent has no DS.

Backups store the DNSSEC keys and restore puts them back for named; the
backup unit gets CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to read them. Jarl raises a zone's
serial above named's whenever it writes an older one (after a restore).
The serials check compares the signed serial.

With a Porkbun API key in jarl.yaml, the registrar's name servers, glue
records and DS records can be shown and changed, each change checked
first (dry run, force to override).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 21:19:04 +00:00

9.5 KiB

Validation

Every change is checked twice before named sees it:

  1. Jarl's validator checks the whole resulting configuration: the DNS rules, references between objects, and option syntax against the BIND 9.20 grammar. Its messages name the record, zone or option and explain the rule.
  2. BIND's own checkers: named-checkconf -z on the complete rendered configuration (which also loads every zone) and named-checkzone. Their messages are mapped back to the object that caused them.

Problems have a severity:

  • error blocks the change (HTTP 422 validation_failed, CLI exit code 6).
  • warning is shown but allowed: probably a mistake, or a security risk.
  • info is a hint.

Only problems that a change introduces block it. Problems that already existed are reported separately (existing_problems) and don't stop unrelated changes, though jarl status, jarl check and the dashboard keep showing them.

Records and zones

Code Severity Rule
record_invalid error Record data must parse for its type (addresses, numbers, names, base64/hex fields, ...). TXT/SPF strings are split into 255-byte pieces automatically
record_name_invalid error Owner names must be valid. Host names in A/AAAA/MX owners follow check-names rules (letters, digits, hyphens; _ only where it is normal, e.g. SRV/TXT owners)
record_out_of_zone error The name must be inside the zone (catches www.example.com without the final dot)
record_duplicate error The same record can't exist twice
cname_conflict error A CNAME must be the only record at its name (RFC 1034), so no CNAME next to A, MX, TXT...
cname_multiple error A name can have only one CNAME
cname_apex error No CNAME at the zone apex (it needs SOA and NS)
cname_loop error CNAMEs that point back to themselves
cname_chain warning CNAME to a CNAME: works, but slows resolution
cname_dangling warning CNAME to a name that doesn't exist in the zone
dname_multiple, below_dname error One DNAME per name, and nothing below a DNAME (RFC 6672)
apex_ns_missing error A zone needs NS records at its apex
ns_no_address error An in-zone name server needs an A or AAAA record (named refuses to load the zone otherwise)
ns_cname, mx_cname, srv_cname error NS, MX and SRV targets must not be CNAMEs (RFC 2181 / RFC 2782)
glue_missing error A delegation to a name server inside the delegated zone needs glue records
target_no_address warning A delegation's name server has no address in the zone
occluded warning Records at or below a delegation point are not served (named answers with a referral)
shadowed_by_zone warning Records hidden because a more specific zone exists in the same view
child_not_delegated info A child zone on this server isn't delegated from its parent, so other resolvers can't find it
ds_not_at_delegation error DS records belong at a delegation point
null_mx_not_alone error A null MX (0 .) must be the only MX
rrset_ttl_mismatch error All records of an RRset need the same TTL (BIND would silently use the first one)
rrset_too_large, too_many_types error BIND 9.20's limits: 100 records per RRset (max-records-per-type), 100 types per name (max-types-per-name)
spf_multiple, dmarc_multiple, dmarc_name warning More than one SPF or DMARC policy (receivers then ignore them), or DMARC outside _dmarc.
wildcard_unusual warning Wildcard NS records
soa_invalid, soa_warning, ttl_invalid error / warning SOA fields and TTLs in range and sensible. One warning covers negative caching longer than 3 hours: resolvers cache "no such name" answers for the smaller of the SOA minimum and the zone's default TTL (RFC 2308), so a new name can stay invisible that long. 1 hour (--minimum 3600) is a good value
zone_name_invalid, zone_type_invalid, zone_duplicate error Valid zone names and types. A zone exists once per view
zone_outside_view error Once views exist, every zone must be in one (named requires this). Create the first view with --adopt-zones to move all zones into it (views.md)
zone_missing_option error Secondary, stub and mirror zones need primaries
zone_file_required / zone_file_invalid / zone_file_managed error Hint zones need a file. Forward zones have none. Primary zone files are Jarl's
zone_inview_invalid, zone_inview_option error in-view zones only inside views, and only with forward/forwarders
zone_records_unmanaged error Only primary zones can have records in Jarl
zone_serial_policy error date, increment or unixtime
zone_no_forwarders, zone_hint_name, zone_name_slash info / warning Unusual but legal setups

ACLs, keys, views, options

Code Severity Rule
acl_element_invalid error Address match elements: addresses, prefixes (host bits must be zero, like BIND requires), !negation, key NAME, ACL names, { nested lists }, any/none/localhost/localnets
acl_ref_missing, key_ref_missing error Every ACL or TSIG key that is referenced must exist
acl_cycle error ACLs that include each other
acl_duplicate, acl_name_invalid, acl_empty, acl_shadowed error / warning Unique names, built-in names reserved, elements that can never match
key_* error / warning Valid key names, a supported algorithm, a base64 secret of a sensible length. hmac-md5/sha1 are flagged as weak
view_duplicate, view_name_invalid, view_acl_invalid error Valid, unique views and match lists
view_unreachable warning A view that comes after one matching every client is never used
option_unknown, option_scope_invalid error The option must exist in BIND 9.20 and be allowed where it is set (server, view, zone of this type, top level)
option_syntax, option_value_invalid error The value must parse (balanced braces, strings, the grammar's value type: yes/no, enums, numbers, durations, sizes, address match lists)
option_duplicate error Options that may appear once, appear once
option_managed error Statements Jarl manages itself can't be raw options: zone, view, acl, key, options, a zone's type/file/in-view/key-directory, a view's match-*, and dnssec-policy in zones, views and server options (set per zone instead; top-level dnssec-policy NAME { } definitions are options)
option_deprecated, option_obsolete, option_unavailable warning Flags from the BIND 9.20 reference
option_experimental info
settings_invalid error Defaults for new zones are valid

DNSSEC

These rules come from dnssec.md. Those that compare the change with the current state are checked when it is applied.

Code Severity Rule
dnssec_zone_type error Only primary zones are signed by Jarl
dnssec_policy_unknown error The zone's policy must be default, insecure or a top-level dnssec-policy statement
dnssec_policy_no_keys error A custom policy with an empty keys { } list (named 9.20 crashes loading it)
dnssec_ttl_too_long error TTLs (and the default TTL) of a signed zone must be at most the policy's max-zone-ttl (a day for the built-in policies); named refuses to load the zone otherwise
dnssec_inline_signing error No inline-signing no on a signed zone
dnssec_off_unsafe error A signed zone can't go straight to unsigned: use the insecure policy first (or wipe, when the parent has no DS)
dnssec_off_too_early, dnssec_off_unknown error Switching off after insecure waits until named is done removing the signatures
dnssec_delete_signed error A signed zone can't be deleted; turn signing off first
dnssec_keys_moved error A signed zone can't move to another view (its keys would change)
dnssec_policy_change warning Changing the policy may replace the keys, and with them the DS at the parent
dnssec_old_keys info Signing a zone whose key directory still has old keys
serial_not_higher error An explicit serial on a signed zone must be above the one named has loaded (automatic serials are raised by themselves)

Security lints

Code Severity What it catches
security_open_resolver warning A view (or the server) where recursion is on and reachable by any client. This includes the BIND trap where allow-recursion is unset and inherits allow-query { any; }. Open resolvers are abused for DDoS amplification. Set allow-recursion to your own networks
security_open_transfer warning allow-transfer open to anyone. Restrict it to your secondaries or a TSIG key
dynamic_update_unsupported error allow-update / update-policy on a Jarl zone. named would write to files that Jarl regenerates, losing the updates. Use the API (e.g. jarl acme) instead

What only BIND checks

named-checkconf and named-checkzone run on every change, so anything Jarl's validator doesn't model is still caught before named loads it. Option values Jarl accepts as raw named.conf syntax, such as logging channels and rrset-order, are the main example. Their errors come back as validation_failed (HTTP 422) with the checker's messages in check, each tied to the object it belongs to.