shadow.enabled in housecarl.yaml loads Housecarl's ruleset so that it blocks, rejects and translates nothing: drops and rejects count and accept (an accept only ends Housecarl's chain), policies accept and log what they would drop, NAT only counts, MSS clamping and the flowtable are left out, and raw rules that do more than accept, drop or reject are left out with a warning. Comments mark what would happen ([would drop]). Filter chains run after the other firewall's (+10) or before (-10); NAT chains always first. Every change is checked by nftables in both forms. No probation; takeovers and closing connections are refused. The boot fallback filters nothing. internal/tablewatch puts the table back after a flush ruleset. Mode in status, healthz, whoami, the web UI, the log and the tracer; hc ruleset --enforcing. docs/shadow.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
353 lines
11 KiB
Go
353 lines
11 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"sort"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"housecarl/internal/api"
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"housecarl/internal/auth"
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"housecarl/internal/model"
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"housecarl/internal/render"
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"housecarl/internal/store"
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"housecarl/internal/validate"
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"housecarl/internal/version"
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)
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// ---- status
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func (s *Server) status(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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if !p.Can(auth.ResConfig, false) && !p.Can(auth.ResLog, false) {
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return forbidden("permission denied: this needs config:read or log:read")
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}
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st := s.eng.State()
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out := api.Status{Build: version.Info(), Started: s.started, Problems: s.eng.Problems(), Probation: s.probationStatus(),
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Interfaces: s.hostInterfaces(st), Counts: map[string]int{}, OtherTables: []string{}, Mode: s.mode()}
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if s.cfg.Shadow {
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out.ShadowPosition = s.cfg.ShadowPosition
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}
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if out.Problems == nil {
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out.Problems = []validate.Problem{}
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}
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if p.IsAdmin() {
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out.Database = s.store.Path()
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}
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for _, k := range model.Kinds {
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out.Counts[k] = len(st.Objects(k))
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}
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if t, err := s.fw.Table(r.Context()); err != nil && st.Empty() {
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out.Unconfigured = true
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} else if err != nil {
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out.ApplyError = err.Error()
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} else if t.Fallback {
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out.ApplyError = fallbackInForce
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} else {
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out.Applied = true
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}
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data, err := s.fw.ListRuleset(r.Context())
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if err == nil {
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out.OtherTables = otherTables(data)
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}
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out.Problems = append(out.Problems, s.hostProblems(r.Context(), data)...)
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out.Problems = append(out.Problems, s.statsProblems()...)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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return nil
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}
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const importedTableKey = "imported_table"
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// shadowProblems are shadow mode's warnings about the machine.
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func (s *Server) shadowProblems(ruleset []byte) []validate.Problem {
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var out []validate.Problem
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if ruleset != nil && len(inputFilters(ruleset)) == 0 {
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out = append(out, validate.Problem{Severity: validate.Warning, Code: "shadow_unprotected", Object: "shadow mode",
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Message: "housecarld is in shadow mode, where its ruleset blocks nothing, and no other table filters what reaches this machine (none has a filter chain on the input hook): nothing protects it; load your firewall, or leave shadow mode"})
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}
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for _, r := range render.ShadowLeftOut(s.eng.State()) {
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out = append(out, validate.Problem{Severity: validate.Warning, Code: "shadow_raw_left_out", Object: r.Label(),
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Message: "shadow mode leaves this raw rule out: it does more to packets than accept, drop or reject (NAT, setting a mark or field, a jump, a verdict map…), so its hits aren't counted and later rules see what it would have taken"})
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}
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return out
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}
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// nftablesUnitLinks are where an enabled nftables.service shows (Debian
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// enables it for sysinit.target).
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var nftablesUnitLinks = []string{
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"/etc/systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants/nftables.service",
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"/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/nftables.service",
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}
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// hostProblems are warnings about the machine rather than the
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// configuration: another ruleset that still loads at boot, or the table
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// an import came from, still in force beside Housecarl's. ruleset is the
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// machine's (nft -j list ruleset; nil: not read). In shadow mode those
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// are expected; the warnings are that nothing else filters, and the raw
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// rules left out.
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func (s *Server) hostProblems(ctx context.Context, ruleset []byte) []validate.Problem {
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if s.cfg.Shadow {
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return s.shadowProblems(ruleset)
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}
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others := otherTables(ruleset)
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var out []validate.Problem
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for _, link := range s.unitLinks {
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if _, err := os.Lstat(link); err == nil {
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out = append(out, validate.Problem{Severity: validate.Warning, Code: "nftables_service", Object: "nftables.service",
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Message: "nftables.service is enabled: at boot it loads /etc/nftables.conf, and stopping or restarting it flushes every table, Housecarl's included; disable it (systemctl disable nftables, without --now)"})
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break
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}
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}
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if t, err := s.store.GetMeta(ctx, importedTableKey); err == nil && t != "" {
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for _, o := range others {
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if o == t {
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out = append(out, validate.Problem{Severity: validate.Warning, Code: "takeover_pending", Object: "table " + t,
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s, the table you imported, still applies beside Housecarl's: a packet must get past both; once Housecarl's rules are right, delete it with 'hc takeover %q'", t, t)})
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}
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// hostInterfaces lists the machine's interfaces with their zones.
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func (s *Server) hostInterfaces(st *model.State) []api.HostInterface {
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out := []api.HostInterface{}
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if s.ifaces == nil {
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return out
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}
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all, err := s.ifaces.All()
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if err != nil {
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return out
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}
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for name, ps := range all {
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hi := api.HostInterface{Name: name, Addresses: []string{}, Up: s.ifaces.Up(name), Zone: zoneOf(st, name)}
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for _, a := range ps {
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hi.Addresses = append(hi.Addresses, a.String())
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}
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out = append(out, hi)
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}
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sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].Name < out[j].Name })
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return out
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}
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// zoneOf names the zone an interface is in: an exact name, else the
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// longest matching wildcard.
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func zoneOf(st *model.State, name string) string {
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best, bestLen := "", -1
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for _, z := range st.Zones {
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for _, i := range z.Interfaces {
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if i == name {
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return z.Name
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}
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if p, ok := strings.CutSuffix(i, "*"); ok && strings.HasPrefix(name, p) && len(p) > bestLen {
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best, bestLen = z.Name, len(p)
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}
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}
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}
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return best
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}
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func (s *Server) interfaces(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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if err := require(p, auth.ResConfig, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.hostInterfaces(s.eng.State()))
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Server) counters(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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if err := require(p, auth.ResLog, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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t, err := s.fw.Table(r.Context())
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if err != nil && s.eng.State().Empty() {
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// Nothing applied yet: nothing counted.
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, api.Counters{Since: s.started, Counters: map[string]api.Counter{}})
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return nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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out := api.Counters{Since: t.Since, Counters: map[string]api.Counter{}}
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for k, c := range t.Counters {
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out.Counters[k] = api.Counter{Packets: c.Packets, Bytes: c.Bytes}
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Server) listAudit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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if err := require(p, auth.ResAudit, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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q := r.URL.Query()
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evs, err := s.store.ListAudit(r.Context(), store.AuditFilter{Username: q.Get("user"), Action: q.Get("action"), Result: q.Get("result"),
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Search: q.Get("q"), Before: int64(queryInt(r, "before", 0)), Limit: queryInt(r, "limit", 200)})
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, evs)
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Server) catalog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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roles := map[string][]string{}
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for n, gs := range auth.Roles {
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roles[n] = grantStrings(gs)
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
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"services": model.BuiltinServices(), "chains": model.Chains, "actions": model.Actions,
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"roles": roles, "log_group": render.LogGroup,
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})
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return nil
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}
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// ---- dynamic sets' entries
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func (s *Server) dynamicSet(r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal, write bool) (*model.AddressSet, error) {
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name := r.PathValue("ref")
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if !p.CanSet(name, write) {
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access := "read"
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if write {
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access = "write"
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}
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return nil, forbidden("permission denied: this needs sets:%s for %s", access, name)
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}
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set := s.eng.State().Set(name)
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if set == nil {
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return nil, notFound("no set %s", name)
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}
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if !set.Dynamic {
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return nil, badRequest("set %s isn't dynamic: change its entries with PATCH /sets/%s", set.Name, set.Name)
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}
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return set, nil
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}
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func (s *Server) listElements(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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set, err := s.dynamicSet(r, p, false)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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t, err := s.fw.Table(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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out := []api.Element{}
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for _, e := range t.Elements[set.Name] {
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out = append(out, api.Element{Address: e.Addr, Timeout: e.Timeout})
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Server) addElement(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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set, err := s.dynamicSet(r, p, true)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var in api.Element
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if err := decodeJSON(r, &in); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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a, err := model.ParseAddress(in.Address)
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if err != nil || !a.Prefix.IsSingleIP() {
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return badRequest("a dynamic set takes single addresses (%q)", in.Address)
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}
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if in.Timeout < 0 || in.Timeout > 366*24*3600 {
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return badRequest("the timeout is in seconds, up to a year")
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}
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if err := s.fw.AddElement(r.Context(), set.Name, a.String(), in.Timeout); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), p, "set.add", set.Name+" "+a.String(), "success", "")
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, api.Element{Address: a.String(), Timeout: in.Timeout})
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return nil
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}
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func (s *Server) deleteElement(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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set, err := s.dynamicSet(r, p, true)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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a, err := model.ParseAddress(r.PathValue("addr"))
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if err != nil {
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return badRequest("%v", err)
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}
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if err := s.fw.DeleteElement(r.Context(), set.Name, a.String()); err != nil {
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return notFound("%s isn't in set %s", a, set.Name)
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}
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s.eng.Audit(r.Context(), p, "set.delete", set.Name+" "+a.String(), "success", "")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return nil
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}
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// ---- the log
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// logRing keeps the latest logged packets.
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type logRing struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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max int
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list []api.LogEntry
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}
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func newLogRing(max int) *logRing { return &logRing{max: max} }
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// Add records a logged packet.
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func (l *logRing) Add(e api.LogEntry) {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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l.list = append(l.list, e)
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if len(l.list) > l.max {
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l.list = append([]api.LogEntry(nil), l.list[len(l.list)-l.max:]...)
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}
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}
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// Latest returns up to n entries, newest first, after a time.
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func (l *logRing) Latest(n int, after time.Time, keep func(api.LogEntry) bool) []api.LogEntry {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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out := []api.LogEntry{}
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for i := len(l.list) - 1; i >= 0 && (n <= 0 || len(out) < n); i-- {
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e := l.list[i]
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if !e.Time.After(after) {
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break
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}
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if keep == nil || keep(e) {
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out = append(out, e)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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// LogPacket records a packet the firewall logged (internal/nflog calls
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// it).
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func (s *Server) LogPacket(e api.LogEntry) {
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e.Shadow = s.cfg.Shadow
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s.logs.Add(e)
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if s.stats != nil {
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s.stats.Packet(e)
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}
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}
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func (s *Server) listLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, p *auth.Principal) error {
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if err := require(p, auth.ResLog, false); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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q := r.URL.Query()
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var after time.Time
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if v := q.Get("after"); v != "" {
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after, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, v)
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}
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search := strings.ToLower(q.Get("q"))
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, s.logs.Latest(queryInt(r, "limit", 200), after, func(e api.LogEntry) bool {
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if search == "" {
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return true
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}
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return strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(e.Prefix+" "+e.Source+" "+e.Dest+" "+e.In+" "+e.Out+" "+e.Protocol), search)
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}))
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return nil
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}
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